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PREEMPTION OF COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND 
THE PROSPECTS FOR FIFRA: JUSTICE STEVENS 
PUTS THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE 
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS† 
INTRODUCTION 
On a range of high-profile issues from affirmative action to sexual 
privacy to sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court in its 2002 Term de-
clined to take the next expected step in its conservative revision of constitu-
tional law.1 With less fanfare, the Court did the same on preemption doc-
trine. On the question of when and to what extent federal safety regulations 
preempt state tort claims against regulated industries, a unanimous Court in 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine2 halted what one scholar has identified as an 
unacknowledged but increasingly broad presumption in favor of preemp-
tion.3 And in a single paragraph, the Court rejected the reasoning of count-
less lower court decisions in favor of preemption.4 By speaking unani-
mously, the Court suggested that it had finally resolved key preemption 
issues on which it has waffled in recent years. While the opinions in Phar-
maceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh,5 decided later 
in the 2002 Term, have been said to crystallize the Justices’ remaining phi-
losophical disagreements on preemption doctrine,6 Sprietsma established 
important areas of agreement, or at least truce. 
This article examines Sprietsma’s implications for preemption doc-
trine and applies its holdings to one federal statute whose preemptive scope 
the Supreme Court will address this Term: the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
 
 † Meloy Trieweiler Law Firm, Helena, Montana. 
 1. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action admissions pro-
gram); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy law); Nev. Dep’t of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that federal Family and Medical Leave Act is en-
forceable against states). 
 2. 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
 3. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 
(2002). 
 4. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64; see also, infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text. 
 5. 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 6. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 449 (2003). 
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cide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).7 Under FIFRA’s authority, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, not the states, controls the labeling of pesti-
cides.8 The overwhelming majority of lower courts have held that FIFRA’s 
regulatory scheme preempts at least some common law tort actions against 
pesticide manufacturers.9 The two holdouts are the Montana Supreme 
Court10 and the Oregon Court of Appeals,11 which have held that FIFRA 
preemption applies only to labeling requirements established by positive 
enactments of state law, not to tort claims. Sprietsma was a victory for 
these FIFRA dissenters and a defeat for the pesticide industry, which has 
sought through FIFRA to immunize itself from tort claims. It was also a 
victory for Justice Stevens, whose careful opinion in an earlier case, Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,12 has been transformed by the pesticide indus-
try and the lower courts into a mandate for FIFRA preemption.13 As the au-
thor of the unanimous Sprietsma decision, Justice Stevens reined in these 
unintended progeny of his Cipollone opinion, choosing instead a new 
course away from the presumption in favor of preemption. 
The history of preemption doctrine, however, is a history of doctrinal 
confusion and frequent changes of course. The Court’s decision in Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences, a FIFRA preemption case to be decided this Term,14 
may reveal whether the Court really meant what it said in Sprietsma. 
 
 7. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136v (2000). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text. In this article I refer to the state law claims 
that may be preempted as both “common law claims” and “tort claims” because cases involving per-
sonal injury are the most common and also the most troubling when preemption means there is no rem-
edy for the injury. It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs in such cases often also plead theories that 
sound in contract, such as breach of warranties related to safety. Many FIFRA preemption cases are 
also “efficacy cases,” in which the plaintiff claims that an agricultural pesticide did not work or even 
harmed the crop. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Case No. 03-388 pending in the Supreme Court, is an 
efficacy case. 
 10. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000) (overruling McAl-
pine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1997), and allowing plaintiffs to proceed with 
claims for negligent design and manufacture, strict liability for defective design and manufacture, fail-
ure to warn, and breach of express and implied warranties), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001). The au-
thor’s law firm represents the plaintiffs in Sleath, which is now awaiting trial on remand. 
 11. Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846 (Or. App. 1999), review denied, 6 P.3d 1098 (Or. 
2000); see also Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 64 F.Supp. 2d 939 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that 
court was compelled by precedent to find preemption but urging Court of Appeals to reconsider FIFRA 
preemption), rev’d 255 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that FIFRA did not preempt claim for unfair 
interference with prospective business advantage, based on change in label requested by manufacturer 
and approved by EPA), rev’d on rehearing, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that claim was pre-
empted). 
 12. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 13. See infra notes 103-116 and accompanying text. 
 14. Case No. 03-388, on writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
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I.  THE SPRIETSMA CASE 
Sprietsma was a preemption case under the Federal Boat Safety Act 
(“FBSA”).15 The FBSA authorizes the Coast Guard to issue regulations to 
promote safety in boating, and it contains an “express preemption” clause, 
that is, a clause that expressly uses Congress’s power under the Supremacy 
Clause to displace state law: 
Unless permitted by the Secretary [of Transportation] under section 4305 
of this title, a State or political subdivision of a State may not establish, 
continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recrea-
tional vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety stan-
dard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment . . . that is not 
identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.16 
This preemption clause is qualified by a “saving clause,” which preserves 
some state law despite the preemption clause: 
Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders pre-
scribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at com-
mon law or under State law.17 
Under the express preemption clause, the Secretary of Transportation has 
generally permitted state statutes and regulations to stand if they govern 
topics on which no federal regulation exists. Once a federal regulation is 
issued on a topic, however, it preempts state standards unless they are iden-
tical to the federal standard.18 
In the late 1980s, the Coast Guard appointed a committee to consider 
requiring propeller guards on motor boats.19 The committee recommended 
regulations requiring the guards under some circumstances.20 But the Coast 
Guard had not acted on the bulk of the recommendations by the time 
Sprietsma arrived in the Supreme Court in 2002.21 The Coast Guard told 
the Court that it planned to do so in unspecified “subsequent regulatory 
projects.”22 
Meanwhile, Jeanne Sprietsma died after being struck by the propeller 
of an outboard motor. Her husband brought common law tort claims in Illi-
nois state court alleging that the motor was unreasonably dangerous, in part 
 
 15. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000). 
 16. 46 U.S.C. § 4306. 
 17. 46 U.S.C. § 4311. 
 18. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 59-60 (2002). 
 19. See id. at 60-61. 
 20. See id. at 61-62 (noting committee recommendation that propeller guards or other “propeller 
injury avoidance methods” be required on “new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with propel-
lers aft of the transom,” as well as on any “nonplaning houseboat for rent”). 
 21. See id. at 62. 
 22. Id. 
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because it lacked a propeller guard.23 The question presented to the Su-
preme Court was whether, as the manufacturer argued, the Coast Guard’s 
failure to require propeller guards on all motor boats barred the plaintiff’s 
claim that this particular boat was defectively designed because it lacked a 
guard.24 
To anyone who has not followed the Supreme Court’s preemption 
cases over the last decade, this issue hardly seems worth the Court’s con-
sideration. After all, the Coast Guard did not ban propeller guards; it only 
failed to act on the guards. And its inaction appears to have stemmed from 
bureaucratic inertia, not a belief that propeller guards were bad. Moreover, 
states were free to require propeller guards affirmatively under an exemp-
tion granted by the Secretary of Transportation.25 And the saving clause 
clearly says that the FBSA does not preempt common law liability.26 Why 
would the Supreme Court grant certiorari merely to affirm Congress’s 
clearly expressed intent not to preempt a claim like Mr. Sprietsma’s? 
The answer is that the Illinois trial, appellate, and supreme courts had 
all held that Mr. Sprietsma’s claim was in fact preempted by the FBSA.27 
Nor were the Illinois courts alone: the Fifth,28 Eighth,29 and Eleventh30 Cir-
cuits, as well as the Michigan Supreme Court,31 had held the same. Justify-
ing its grant of certiorari by a split of authority, the Supreme Court could 
cite only one jurisdiction, Texas, that had rejected the FBSA preemption 
defense.32 
 
 23. Id. at 54-55. 
 24. Id. at 54. 
 25. Id. at 60, 65-66 (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 6914-15 (1973)). 
 26. To the uninitiated, the saving clause may even seem unnecessary: the rule is well-established 
at common law that compliance with government regulations is admissible evidence in a tort suit but is 
not a complete defense; regulations set the floor, not the ceiling, for the standard of care. See 2 Ameri-
can Law Institute, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Approaches to Legal and Institutional 
Change, 83-84 (Reporters’ Study 1991); see also Daniel B. Nelson, 1995 ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 565, 
571-72 (discussing pros and cons of dual remedial systems). 
 27. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55. 
 28. Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 29. Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 30. Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 31. Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997). 
 32. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55 n. 3 (citing Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994)). In addition to the Texas Supreme Court, intermediate courts of appeals in 
California and Missouri had ruled against FBSA preemption of propeller guard claims. See LaPlante v. 
Wellcraft Marine Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 (Cal. App. 2002); Ard. v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. 
App. 1999) (ruling against FBSA preemption of propeller guard claims). No federal court had done so 
before Sprietsma. In addition to the federal courts of appeals listed above, a few federal district courts in 
other circuits had ruled in favor of preemption. See Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F.Supp. 183 
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Nor were these decisions anomalies in modern preemption doctrine. 
After an exhaustive review of a century of preemption decisions, Professor 
Mary Davis confidently predicted that Sprietsma would be decided in favor 
of preempting Mr. Sprietsma’s claim.33 Her prediction was wrong not be-
cause her analysis was faulty but because Sprietsma abandoned a course 
the Court had been charting since Cipollone a decade before. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREEMPTING THE COMMON LAW34 
A. Basics of Preemption Doctrine 
Federal preemption of state law can occur in two ways: express pre-
emption or implied preemption. Either of these forms of preemption can 
preempt two categories of state law: positive law or common law.35 Courts 
make decisions about whether a federal statute either expressly or implic-
itly preempts either type of state law by relying on presumptions favoring 
or disfavoring particular types of preemption.36 
Many federal statutes have express preemption clauses like the one in 
the FBSA. When such a clause is present, it is clear Congress intended to 
preempt some state law. The only question is the scope of that preemption. 
For example, the FBSA preempts any state law or regulation “establishing 
a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety 
standard.”37 Thus, to determine whether a particular state law is preempted, 
a court must decide whether it is a “performance or other safety standard” 
for a “recreational vessel or associated equipment” as those words are used 
in the statute. Similarly, FIFRA preempts only some state laws related to 
pesticides: FIFRA’s express preemption clause prohibits states from impos-
ing labeling requirements on pesticides, but it does not prohibit them from 
regulating matters such as the sale, use, or disposal of pesticides.38 
Even when a federal statute contains no express preemption clause, 
courts may conclude that it implicitly preempts some state law. Implied 
 
(E.D. Cal. 1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F.Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993); Mowery v. Mer-
cury Marine, 773 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (ruling in favor of preemption). 
 33. Davis, supra note 3, at 1025-28. 
 34. For a more comprehensive history, see id. 
 35. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text (discussing two seminal cases on the distinction 
between positive law and common law for purposes of preemption). 
 36. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
 37. 46 U.S.C. § 4306. 
 38. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (preemption clause); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000) (saving clause); 
Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (affirming state authority to regulate pesticide 
use). 
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preemption occurs in three ways: impossibility preemption, where state and 
federal law are in such direct conflict that it is impossible to comply with 
the dictates of both; obstacle preemption, where dual compliance is techni-
cally possible but the state law nonetheless creates an obstacle to fulfilling 
federal policy; and field preemption, where Congress has so completely 
taken over a field of law as to create an inference of federal exclusivity.39 
For example, even if FIFRA did not have an express preemption clause 
about pesticide labeling, state labeling laws might be preempted by one or 
more forms of implied preemption. A state law requiring warning labels to 
be orange would be preempted by “impossibility preemption” if federal law 
required labels to be red. A state law requiring many warnings on a label 
might be preempted if it created an “obstacle” to a federal goal of keeping 
labels simple and easy to understand. Or all state labeling laws might be 
preempted by “field preemption” because FIFRA is so comprehensive that 
it suggests Congress intended to take over the field. Complicating matters, 
the Supreme Court has also occasionally found implied preemption even 
when the statute also contains an express preemption clause.40 The result is 
greater preemption than the express clause specifies. With any form of im-
plied preemption, as with express preemption, once a court decides that a 
federal statute impliedly preempts state law, it must determine the substan-
tive scope of preemption, e.g., whether FIFRA preempts all pesticide-
related laws or just labeling laws. 
In the case of both express and implied preemption, a court must also 
determine the scope of preemption with respect to the type of state law pre-
empted: does the federal statute preempt only positive law enacted by the 
states, or does it also preempt tort claims under each state’s common law? 
An express preemption clause typically says that it preempts state “regula-
tions,” “standards,” “requirements,” or “laws.” Courts must decide whether 
the duties forming the basis for tort liability are “regulations,” “standards,” 
“requirements,” or “laws,” as Congress intended those terms to be inter-
preted when it enacted the express preemption clause. For example, the 
first question presented in Sprietsma was whether the duty alleged in the 
tort claim was a “law or regulation” as those terms are used in the FBSA.41 
 
 39. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63, 64-65 (2002) (describing express and 
implied preemption). The Supreme Court has not always been consistent in the terms it uses to describe 
the different kinds of preemption. Frequently, the Court uses the term “conflict preemption” to include 
the two kinds of preemption I have called “impossibility” and “obstacle.” I will use the latter terms to 
keep the distinction between the two clear. 
 40. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 
514 U.S. 280 (1995); see also infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing Geier and Freight-
liner). 
 41. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62-63. 
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The same question arises under FIFRA: given that FIFRA’s express pre-
emption clause preempts state labeling “requirements,” does FIFRA also 
preempt tort claims related to pesticide labels, such as a claim for breach of 
warranty or failure to warn? The question also arises when a court conducts 
an implied preemption analysis: does allowing a particular tort claim to 
proceed make it impossible to comply with federal law, create an obstacle 
to achieving federal policies, or intrude on a field that Congress has occu-
pied exclusively? 
Because every federal statute has different language, structure, and 
purpose, deciding its preemptive effect always requires an individualized 
examination of the statute. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has articulated 
several presumptions to guide its preemption analysis. First, the Court has 
established a general presumption against preemption, at least in areas of 
law traditionally regulated by the states.42 Second, even after it is clear that 
a statute preempts some state law, the Court continues to apply this pre-
sumption against preemption to limit the substantive scope of preemption.43 
FIFRA, for example, clearly preempts pesticide labeling requirements un-
der state law, but it allows states to regulate the use of pesticides. If a par-
ticular state law falls into a gray area, so that a court is unsure whether it 
regulates only pesticide use or whether it is also an attempt to regulate the 
label,44 the court should apply the presumption against preemption and al-
low the state law to stand. The focus of this Article is a third presumption, 
one that applies to the type of state law preempted. Once a court decides 
that a federal statute preempts state regulation of a particular field through 
positive law, should the court presume that tort claims in that field are also 
preempted? Or should it adopt yet another presumption against preemption, 
requiring additional evidence of specific congressional intent to preempt 
the common law? The Supreme Court has done both at different points in 
the development of its preemption jurisprudence, without clearly articulat-
ing a presumption in one direction or the other.45 In FIFRA cases, lower 
courts have preferred the Court’s presumption in favor of preemption, hold-
ing that there is no meaningful difference between positive law and com-
mon law and that both must therefore be preempted. Sprietsma, however, 
 
 42. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), cited in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
418 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 43. Medtronic, 418 U.S. at 485. 
 44. For example, a state law might prohibit the residential use of a particular pesticide. The manu-
facturer would argue that this prohibition amounts to a regulation of the label since it suggests the label 
should advise users not to apply the product in homes. 
 45. See Part II.B, infra. 
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rejects this view and signals the Court’s intent to adhere to all three pre-
sumptions against preemption. 
B. The Supreme Court Cases 
Modern jurisprudence on preemption of common law claims begins 
with Cipollone in 1992, but two earlier cases have continued to play key 
roles as embodiments of competing philosophies about preemption of tort 
liability. At important moments in the development of modern preemption 
doctrine, the Court has looked to the 1959 decision in San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon46 when holding that common law claims are 
preempted47 and to the 1984 decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corpora-
tion48 when holding that they are not.49 
In Garmon, an employer brought a tort claim against a union for eco-
nomic losses allegedly caused by peaceful picketing.50 The premise of the 
tort claim was that organizing the picket was an unfair labor practice.51 The 
Supreme Court held that this claim was preempted by the federal govern-
ment’s broad authority under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).52 This holding might be considered atypical of preemption 
cases because the NLRA is a “strong” preempter, on par only with 
ERISA53 in the strength and breadth of its preemptive force.54 But Garmon 
became influential as precedent for its recognition of the regulatory role—
and thus the “preemptability”—of the common law. 
Tort law aims not only at compensating victims but also at regulating 
behavior through the threat of damages awards.55 The duty of care that 
forms the basis for a tort action can thus be likened to a statute or other en-
actment of positive law. The Garmon Court relied on this analogy to hold 
 
 46. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 47. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (citing Garmon). Cipollone is discussed infra at notes 73-
84 and accompanying text. 
 48. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
 49. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (citing Silkwood). Medtronic is 
discussed infra at notes 85-101 and accompanying text. 
 50. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237. 
 51. Id. at 245. 
 52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). 
 53. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. 
 54. The strength of preemption under ERISA and the NLRA is evidenced primarily through re-
moval doctrine. Normally, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense such as preemption 
cannot serve as a basis for removal to federal court. Preemption under these two statutes, however, is so 
complete that a complaint purporting to plead common law claims will be construed as stating a claim 
under the federal law and can thus be removed. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) 
(ERISA); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (NLRA). 
 55. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247. 
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that a state could no more regulate industrial relations through its tort law 
than it could through its positive law.56 Hence state tort claims arising from 
a labor dispute were preempted by federal law.57 
The Court did not face another case involving preemption of common 
law claims until Silkwood twenty-five years later. In Silkwood, the Court 
held that the plaintiff could recover under state tort law for injuries caused 
by negligent operation of a nuclear power plant, even though nuclear safety 
is regulated exclusively by the federal Atomic Energy Commission.58 The 
Court acknowledged the defendant’s reliance on Garmon and did not refute 
its assertion that the common law has a regulatory function.59 The Court, 
however, held that a federal law’s preemption of the common law should 
not automatically mimic its preemption of positive law.60 There was no 
question that the Atomic Energy Act preempted the state from enacting 
statutes or administrative regulations governing the nuclear industry: al-
though it contained no express preemption clause, Congress had concluded 
the states were basically incompetent in this field of regulation, and it had 
occupied the field.61 Nonetheless, the Court insisted on a distinction be-
tween regulation by common law and regulation by positive law. Applying 
a presumption against preemption, the Court noted there was no specific 
evidence that Congress had intended to preempt common law claims, while 
there was some evidence that Congress had assumed the common law sur-
vived.62 Most importantly, Congress had not provided an alternative means 
of redress for people injured by negligence in the nuclear industry. The 
Court simply could not believe “that Congress would, without comment, 
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal con-
duct.”63 
Silkwood is an especially strong statement against preemption of 
common law claims because the issue before the Court was limited to 
 
 56. See id. at 245. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984). 
 59. Id. at 249. 
 60. See id. at 256. 
 61. Id. at 248-51. 
 62. Id. at 251-55. The Court noted that Congress had passed legislation establishing a govern-
ment-backed indemnification and limited liability scheme available to nuclear facilities that obtained 
insurance against the first $60 million in tort claims. The Senate Report on that legislation stated that 
“the rights of third parties who are injured are established by State law.” Id. at 252 (quoting S. REP. NO. 
85-296, at 9 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1810). Later amendments required nuclear 
facilities to waive certain defenses they could otherwise assert in state tort actions. Id. at 253. 
 63. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251. Despite this reference to “illegal” conduct, the Court’s preemption 
analysis did not limit the defendant’s liability to claims for negligence per se based on violations of fed-
eral regulations. 
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whether punitive damages were preempted; the jury’s award of compensa-
tory damages was unchallenged.64 Far from seeking to “remove all means 
of judicial recourse,”65 the defendant challenged only that portion of the 
judgment which was avowedly regulatory.66 The Court rejected the argu-
ments of both the defendant and the government (appearing as amicus) and 
noted there was no actual conflict with federal law since it was not physi-
cally impossible to pay both punitive damages and any fines imposed under 
federal law.67 Having concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt 
common law claims in general and that impossibility preemption did not 
apply, the Court simply noted that punitive damages were an established 
feature of tort law and that there was no specific evidence that Congress in-
tended to eliminate them.68 The Court declined to find either field or obsta-
cle preemption in the absence of concrete evidence of congressional intent 
to preempt common law claims rather than just positive law. 
Silkwood’s insistence on a distinction between positive and common 
law at first seems inconsistent with Garmon’s treatment of them as equiva-
lent. But the cases differ in whether a remedy was available for the wrong-
ful conduct, and this difference was important to the Court.69 In Garmon, 
the Court could rely on the broad authority of the National Labor Relations 
Board to provide a remedy through its oversight of labor disputes and 
power to enjoin unfair pickets,70 whereas in Silkwood there was no federal 
relief available. Moreover, Garmon was limited to the narrow circum-
stances where the state tort duty arose directly from standards about what 
constitutes an unfair labor practice.71 The Court made clear that tort law 
would not be preempted in other labor disputes, for example those “marked 
by violence and imminent threats to the public order,” because in those 
situations the state’s compelling interest in preserving its own laws “is not 
 
 64. See id. at 246. 
 65. Id. at 251 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 244-45 (quoting trial court’s instructions on punitive damages). 
 67. Id. at 257. In Silkwood, the Court did not appear even to consider whether the government’s 
view on preemption was entitled to special weight. More recent cases have debated the degree of defer-
ence that should be afforded to the executive branch’s opinions about the preemptive scope of statutes 
administered by executive agencies. This debate is discussed infra notes 181–191 and accompanying 
text. 
 68. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255. 
 69. Compare id. at 251 (noting that Congress’s failure to provide remedy supported conclusion 
that Congress did not intend to eliminate state remedies) with Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242 (explaining that 
Congress had “entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative 
agency”). 
 70. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. 
 71. Id. at 239 (noting that state court had “held that those activities constituted a tort based on an 
unfair labor practice under state law”). 
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overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.”72 
Thus, even under the strongly preemptive NLRA, most common law 
claims are governed by the Silkwood rule and presumed to survive preemp-
tion. While Garmon says tort claims can be subjected to preemption analy-
sis, Silkwood says that in the absence of clear evidence of preemptive in-
tent, state law will survive and that the absence of a federal remedy is 
evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state remedies. 
Despite having joined the majority in Silkwood, Justice Stevens cited 
only Garmon when he authored the plurality opinion in Cipollone.73 Justice 
Stevens’s Cipollone opinion staked out a middle ground between complete 
preemption and no preemption based on close readings of the two preemp-
tion statutes at issue in that case: two different versions of the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act, later known as the Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act.74 The 1965 version of the Act’s preemption clause 
stated, 
No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required [on ciga-
rette packages or advertisements, except as provided by the federal 
law].75 
In 1969, this clause was revised to state, 
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the pro-
visions of this Act.76 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Stevens first concluded that the 
1965 Act preempted only positive enactments of state law, leaving com-
mon law claims untouched.77 To the majority, the term “statements” im-
plicitly referred to the type of warning requirement that Congress imposed 
elsewhere in the same Act and thus appeared to preempt only similar en-
actments by States.78 Echoing though not citing Silkwood, the Court briefly 
noted that there was “no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-
emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state 
common-law damages actions.”79 Justice Stevens also wrote for the major-
ity what might have been (if adhered to in later cases) an important new 
rule for restricting preemption: where Congress has expressed its intentions 
 
 72. Id. at 247. 
 73. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992). 
 74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. I 1965); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. V 1965-1969). 
 75. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 § 5(b) (1965). 
 76. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 § 5(b) (1969). 
 77. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519-20. 
 78. Id. at 518-19. 
 79. Id. at 518. 
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through a preemption clause, the Court’s duty begins and ends with inter-
preting that clause.80 The Cipollone majority thus rejected the notion that 
“implied preemption” could operate to preempt state law beyond Con-
gress’s expressed intent. 
Turning to the 1969 Act, Justice Stevens—writing no longer for a ma-
jority but for a plurality—quoted Garmon and emphasized the fungibility 
of the common law and positive law as means for regulating conduct.81 He 
found that the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . under State law” 
was a broad one and could reasonably be read to include common law 
claims.82 Contrary to Silkwood, he stated that common law claims should 
be deemed within the scope of the Act’s preemption clause unless there 
was “good reason to believe” they were excluded.83 The Cipollone plurality 
thus appeared to abandon Silkwood’s presumption against preemption of 
common law claims. In doing so, it sowed the seeds of a presumption in 
favor of preemption, based on a philosophical stance that saw no functional 
difference between positive and common law. Although only three other 
Justices joined this portion of Justice Stevens’s opinion, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas disagreed with Justice Stevens only in that they felt he did not go 
far enough, arguing that both versions of the Act preempted common law 
claims.84 
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Cipollone contained two innovations in 
preemption law. First, Justice Stevens focused intensely on the language of 
the express preemption clause, refusing to consider an implied preemption 
analysis unmoored from Congress’s words. Second, he continued this close 
examination of the text in deciding whether common law claims were pre-
empted, without reference to Silkwood’s presumption against extending 
preemption to include tort claims. Instead, the bulk of the Cipollone opin-
ion relied on Garmon’s theory of the equivalence of positive and common 
law. This second innovation could have expanded federal preemption be-
yond what Congress expected when it enacted the scores of federal statutes 
that regulate areas of traditional state authority. But it was restrained by the 
first innovation’s requirement to study the statutory language for signs of 
congressional intent. 
The Court soon repudiated Justice Stevens’s first innovation. In 1995 
in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, a unanimous Court hinted that it could go 
beyond an express preemption clause and apply implied preemption analy-
 
 80. Id. at 517. 
 81. Id. at 521. 
 82. Id. at 520, 522. 
 83. Id. at 521 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). 
 84. Id. at 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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sis even where Congress’s express preemptive intent did not extend to 
common law claims.85 One year later, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court 
flip-flopped again, re-embracing Justice Stevens’s first innovation and lim-
iting its analysis of the Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the ex-
press terms of the statute.86 Once again, the Court was unanimous on this 
point. But this vacillating unanimity evaporated in Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co., which came down heavily in favor of implied preemp-
tion even where an express preemption clause exists and does not contem-
plate preempting common law claims.87 Justice Stevens capitulated to the 
new majority in Sprietsma, accepting that there may be implied preemption 
even where Congress has expressly stated what should be preempted.88 
Preemption doctrine thus lost the benefit of Justice Steven’s effort in Cipol-
lone to tie the preemption analysis closely to Congress’s expressed intent. 
This concession, however, enabled Justice Stevens to use Sprietsma to rein 
in the expansion of his second innovation, which lower courts had carried 
well beyond the bounds of Cipollone. 
While the lower courts tended to ignore the first Cipollone innovation, 
which operated to limit implied preemption, they embraced the second, 
which expanded express preemption.89 In Medtronic, however, four years 
after Cipollone, Justice Stevens wrote another plurality opinion, again high-
lighting the importance of focusing the preemption inquiry on Congress’s 
intent.90 The Medtronic company sought to shield itself from liability for 
injuries caused by a pacemaker, under the preemption clause of the MDA: 
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in 
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable 
under [federal law] and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of 
the device or to any other matter [covered by a federal requirement].91 
The company, modeling its arguments on Cipollone’s treatment of the 1969 
Cigarette Act, claimed that because the word “requirement” is used in both 
Acts, both should be construed to preempt common law duties as well as 
positive law.92 
 
 85. 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). 
 86. 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996). 
 87. 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). 
 88. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869). 
 89. See supra notes 103-130 and accompanying text. 
 90. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479, 487 (1996). 
 91. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000). 
 92. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486. 
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Despite his Cipollone opinion, Justice Stevens called this argument 
“not only unpersuasive” but even “implausible.”93 This time he turned to 
Silkwood, arguing the unlikelihood that Congress would have eliminated 
tort liability for an entire industry without comment, especially since the 
stated purpose of the MDA was the need for more oversight of that indus-
try.94 Justice Stevens distinguished Cipollone, saying that the substantive 
scope of the Cigarette Act was narrow, extending only to advertising and 
promotion.95 Applying the same reasoning in Medtronic would have pre-
empted a much wider range of claims, and Justice Stevens was not com-
fortable extinguishing so much common law and effectively immunizing an 
entire industry without better evidence of Congress’s intent. Thus, Med-
tronic qualified Justice Stevens’s apparent proposal in Cipollone to disre-
gard the Silkwood presumption against preempting common law claims, 
even where preemption of positive law was clear. The drastic act of dis-
pensing with the Silkwood presumption was appropriate only where the 
class of tort claims thereby eliminated was narrow. This qualification also 
helps explain Justice Stevens’s reliance on Garmon in his Cipollone opin-
ion since Garmon explicitly stated that most tort claims would be preserved 
unless Congress “clearly expressed” its desire to preempt them, and since 
Garmon used the NLRA to preempt only a narrow class of claims.96 Justice 
Stevens’s Medtronic opinion clarified that Cipollone’s reliance on Garmon, 
and its abandonment of the Silkwood presumption, was appropriate only 
because the preemptive effect was narrow. 
Again, however, Justice Stevens wrote only for a plurality. The fifth 
vote against preemption came from Justice Breyer, who wrote his own 
opinion concurring in the judgment.97 While he did not reject a general pre-
sumption against preempting common law claims, Justice Breyer chafed at 
the plurality’s suggestion that the MDA categorically did not preempt 
common law claims. He insisted that some common law claims would be 
preempted.98 As an example, he imagined a federal regulation that required 
a hearing aid to have a two-inch wire, while a state court action alleged 
negligence or design defect for failure to use a one-inch wire. Surely, he 
argued, such a claim would be preempted.99 Justice Breyer’s view prevailed 
in Geier, where his opinion for the Court held that under the National Traf-
 
 93. Id. at 487. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 488-89. 
 96. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). 
 97. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 502 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 504-05 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act100 a tort claim for failure to install an air-
bag was implicitly preempted because it posed an obstacle to federal policy 
that airbags be phased-in gradually rather than installed all at once.101 
In Geier and Sprietsma, the Court at last concluded that it will apply 
its implied preemption doctrine even where an express clause exists. The 
Court has even at times found it more convenient to give only cursory 
treatment—or none at all—to a statute’s express preemption clause, focus-
ing instead on the Court’s own analysis of what kinds of state law activity 
might conflict with federal goals.102 Until Sprietsma, the Court had offered 
little further guidance on express preemption beyond the confusing array of 
opinions in Cipollone and Medtronic. 
C. Lower Court Responses in FIFRA Cases 
Cipollone and Medtronic dominate lower court decisions on FIFRA 
preemption. Before Cipollone, federal courts were split on FIFRA preemp-
tion. The D.C. Circuit had ruled against preemption of common law claims, 
echoing Silkwood in its concern not to eliminate tort liability just because 
the federal government had taken over the role of establishing minimum 
safety standards.103 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this view and argued that 
positive law and common law were equivalent, and both were pre-
empted.104 But after Cipollone, FIFRA preemption swept the courts.105 Like 
 
 100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (repealed 1994). 
 101. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864-866 (2000). 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 867-69 (briefly discussing express preemption before considering implied pre-
emption); see also Davis, supra note 3, at 1007 (discussing Geier’s cursory treatment of express pre-
emption clause); Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (finding implied preemp-
tion without any discussion of MDA’s express preemption clause). 
 103. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 104. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and jmt. va-
cated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). The Papas court noted that Ferebee was the only other court of appeals 
decision on FIFRA preemption and that the district courts were divided in their opinions on the issue. 
Id. at 1021 n. 1 (citing district court cases). The Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in 
favor of preemption and remanded for reconsideration in light of Cipollone. On remand, the Eleventh 
Circuit adhered to its original holding, and certiorari was denied. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993). 
 105. All six federal courts of appeals to consider FIFRA preemption in the four years after Cipol-
lone concluded that it preempted at least some common law claims. Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 
59 F.3d 69, 75 (8th Cir. 1995); Taylor Ag Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1995); 
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 
F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1993); Ark.-Platte & Gulf P’ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 
1179 (10th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993). The supreme courts of 
eleven states agreed. McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474, 477 (Mont. 1997), overruled 
by Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000); Schuver v. E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610, 612-16 (Iowa 1996); Hopkins v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 666 So.2d 
615, 619-22 (La. 1996); Eide v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 542 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (S.D. 1996); 
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the 1969 Cigarette Act at issue in Cipollone, FIFRA uses a form of the 
word “requirement” in its preemption clause: 
[A] State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for la-
beling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under 
this subchapter.106 
Even more important than this textual similarity was Cipollone’s sugges-
tion that there is no meaningful difference between regulation through posi-
tive law and regulation through the tort system.107 Lower courts have re-
peated this principle like a mantra in FIFRA cases without recognizing the 
narrow bounds placed on it in Garmon.108 
The sweeping effect of Cipollone on FIFRA preemption cases is a 
striking example of how a nuanced Supreme Court decision can be applied 
simplistically by lower courts seeking doctrinal guidance. Cipollone was 
hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of preemption; it held that one preemp-
tion clause did not preempt common law claims while the other preempted 
some, but not all. Lower courts, however, seized on the word “require-
ment” as a similarity between the preempting 1969 Cigarette Act and 
FIFRA and ignored a different form of the same word—”required”—in the 
non-preempting 1965 Cigarette Act.109 Justice Stevens reached opposite 
conclusions about these two versions of the Cigarette Act based not on this 
single word but on a close reading of the entire statute. His opinion in Med-
tronic and his reliance on Garmon make clear he was influenced by the fact 
that only a small class of claims would be barred if he found preemption.110 
That factor, however, was not immediately clear in his Cipollone opinion, 
nor was it a factor for lower courts busily clearing their dockets of pesticide 
cases. “Cipollone” became shorthand for the simple syllogism that the 
word “requirements” in preemption clauses undoubtedly includes enact-
 
Hochberg v. Zoecon Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-67 (Mass. 1995); Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 
S.W.2d 819, 820-21 (Tex. 1995); Goodwin v. Bacon, 896 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1995); Gorton v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746, 753, 754 n. 8 (Wis. 1995)Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 
671, 676 (Ga. 1994); Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 888 P.2d 869, 873-84 (Kan. 1994); Davidson v. 
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 937 (Nev. 1992). 
 106. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000). 
 107. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992). 
 108. See, e.g., Ark.-Platte & Gulf P’ship, 981 F.2d at 1179 (“Indeed, a state common law duty to 
warn is nothing more than a duty to label a product to provide information. In that sense, the common 
law duty is no less a “requirement” in the preemption scheme than a state statute imposing the same 
burden.”). See also Nelson, supra note 26, at 584 (“Cipollone’s rejection of a distinction between com-
mon law damage actions and positive legal enactments has had significant consequences for the FIFRA 
preemption controversy.”). 
 109. See, e.g., MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1024 (“If the encompassing words of the statute standing 
alone do not convince the skeptics, surely Cipollone leaves no doubt but that the FIFRA term ‘any re-
quirements’ makes no distinction between positive enactments and the common law.”). 
 110. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486-89 (1996); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
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ments of positive state law; positive and common law are equivalent; there-
fore, common law claims are preempted.111 
Once this reading of Cipollone became entrenched in FIFRA litiga-
tion, the question became not whether common law claims were pre-
empted, but which claims were preempted. In Cipollone, Justice Stevens 
had used his close reading of the Cigarette Act to identify which claims fell 
within the substantive reach of the preemption clause.112 In Cipollone, that 
meant “failure to warn” claims were preempted since they rested on a state 
law duty “based on smoking and health.”113 Other claims, however, were 
not preempted. An express warranty claim was based on general contract 
law, not on smoking and health, and thus was not preempted.114 Further 
complicating the matter, Justice Stevens found that a claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation was partially preempted, depending on the particular fac-
tual allegations and duty of care alleged by the plaintiff.115 Courts have fol-
lowed a similar approach in FIFRA preemption cases, usually holding that 
failure-to-warn claims are preempted but design defect claims are not.116 
The intricacy of this analysis, however, opened the door to a creeping 
expansion of preemption: in FIFRA cases, it boils down to a litigation 
strategy by the pesticide industry that recasts all claims as essentially about 
the labels.117 Suppose a plaintiff alleges a pesticide was defectively de-
signed because it was unreasonably dangerous when used, as intended, in 
homes, offices, and other indoor places where people breathe. Says the de-
 
 111. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 584-85 (“Cipollone must be seen to clearly repudiate Fere-
bee’s permissive approach to state damage actions.”). 
 112. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-30. 
 113. Id. at 524-25. 
 114. Id. at 525-27. 
 115. Justice Stevens indicated that claims based on misrepresentations in advertising or promo-
tional materials were preempted, except to the extent that there were actual, intentional misstatements of 
material fact. A fraudulent misrepresentation claim could also be based on the failure to disclose mate-
rial facts through channels other than advertising or promotion, such as to a state regulatory agency. 
The rationale for these distinctions was that the text of the preemption clause limited its scope to “ad-
vertising or promotion” and that the general duty not to make false statements of material fact could be 
applied in this context without thereby becoming a “requirement . . . based on smoking and health.” Id. 
at 527-29. 
 116. Nelson, supra note 26, at 586 (summarizing areas of agreement among lower courts address-
ing FIFRA preemption after Cipollone). 
 117. See, e.g., Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564-65 (1st Cir. 1996) (accepting 
defendant’s argument that design defect claim, premised on product being unreasonably dangerous 
when used in foreseeable manner, to control pests in private homes, was preempted because it was “ef-
fectively no more than an attack on the failure to warn against residential use”); Sleath v. West Mont 
Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042, 1043-44, 1053 (Mont. 2000) (noting defendant’s argument that 
even design defect claims were preempted); see also infra note 118 (citing cases involving arguments 
that claims for breach of express warranty are preempted). 
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fendant, “What you really mean is that the label should have warned you 
not to use it in homes or offices without adequate ventilation. Your ‘design 
defect’ claim is merely a failure-to-warn claim in disguise.” This argument 
has the same easy appeal as the argument that tort law is just positive law 
in disguise, and the pesticide industry has had some success pushing the 
boundaries of preemption through this reasoning.118 But the further it is 
pushed, the more FIFRA preemption threatens a broad class of claims as in 
Silkwood, rather than a narrow class as in Garmon. Indeed, this overreach-
ing may have prompted a few courts to re-examine their position on FIFRA 
preemption in light of Medtronic.119 
In most jurisdictions, Medtronic has not affected FIFRA preemption. 
Even though Medtronic also involved the word “requirement” and found 
no preemption, most courts have not been moved to revisit FIFRA for a 
closer analysis; instead, they have continued to rely on their Cipollone-
based preemption holdings.120 But as FIFRA preemption spread, the EPA 
got involved. In 1999 it submitted a brief in a California case in which it 
undertook a comprehensive analysis of FIFRA, as Justice Stevens had done 
for the Cigarette Act and the MDA but which lower courts had failed to do 
in simplistically applying only a portion of Cipollone to FIFRA.121 Mimick-
ing Justice Stevens’s discussion of the 1965 Cigarette Act, the EPA showed 
that, throughout FIFRA, the word “requirements” is used to refer to posi-
tive law.122 The EPA drew on Medtronic and Silkwood to show that there 
was no specific congressional intent to extinguish tort liability, and that 
 
 118. For example, courts have split on whether express warranty claims are preempted. Some 
courts have held that all warranty claims are preempted because the warranty appears on the label. E.g., 
Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564 (1st Cir. 1996); Taylor Ag. Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 
F.3d 555, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1994); McAlpine 
v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474, 478 (Mont. 1997), overruled by Sleath v. West Mont Home 
Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000); Clubine v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d 385, 387 
(Iowa 1995). Others have held that a warranty was preempted to the extent the EPA mandated the war-
ranty but not preempted to the extent the EPA merely approved the inclusion on the label of a warranty 
proposed by the manufacturer. Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1993); United AGRI Prods. v. Kawamata Farms, 
Inc., 948 P.2d 1055, 1078-80 (Haw. 1997); Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F.Supp. 751, 760-61 
(N.D.N.Y. 1994). None of these courts has grappled with the absurdity of a system under which a war-
ranty is either mandated or approved but is unenforceable. 
 119. In the Montana case, for example, the lower court had held that all the plaintiffs’ tort claims 
were preempted, even a claim for design defect, and the state supreme court expressed concern about 
the breadth of preemption claimed by the defendant. Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1043-44, 1053. 
 120. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999); Kuiper v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997); Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 121. Br. Amicus Curiae for the U.S. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Etcheverry v. TRI-AG 
Serv. Inc., No. S072524 (Cal.) (filed March 1999). 
 122. Id. at 14-17. 
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there was some evidence Congress assumed the common law would sur-
vive.123 Although the California Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s analy-
sis,124 Montana embraced it in Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, 
Inc.125 Overruling a prior decision, Sleath held that FIFRA’s preemption 
clause does not apply to common law actions for damages.126 But the Mon-
tana court’s reliance on the EPA brief may have come just in time for the 
Sleath plaintiffs, as this brief was itself short-lived. 
Sleath was decided in December 2000, around the same time a new 
president, more inclined to favor the pesticide industry over tort plaintiffs, 
was selected. In May 2003, the U.S. Solicitor General submitted a brief on 
a certiorari petition in a FIFRA preemption case from Texas.127 In that 
brief, the (Bush) government repudiated its prior (Clintonian) brief and 
embraced the lower court authority holding that FIFRA preemption in-
cludes common law claims.128 Like those lower court decisions, the gov-
ernment’s reasoning was based primarily on the theory that there is no co-
herent distinction between positive and common law.129 Until Sprietsma, 
Montana and Oregon stood alone in rejecting this theory and refusing to 
believe that the Congress that enacted FIFRA had, “without comment, re-
move[d] all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal con-
duct.”130 
For those who read the tea leaves of the Court’s grants of certiorari, 
the grant in Bates v. Dow bodes well for Montana, Oregon, and FIFRA 
plaintiffs. Heedless of Sprietsma, the government has continued to argue its 
new theory that FIFRA preempts common law claims when commenting 
on certiorari petitions in FIFRA preemption cases. In its first amicus brief 
announcing its new position, the government suggested that certiorari 
might be appropriate but for the fact that the petition was premature, thus 
depriving the Court of jurisdiction.131 But in Bates, where the lower court 
favored the defendant, the government argued against certiorari, noting 
that almost all lower courts had accepted the preemption argument and por-
 
 123. Id. at 23-32. 
 124. Etcheverry v. TRI-AG Serv. Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000). 
 125. 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000). 
 126. Id. at 1047-48, 1048-49, 1050, 1052 (referring to the Etcheverry brief). 
 127. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.). 
 128. Id. at 17. The problems with this theory are discussed in Part III.B infra. 
 129. Id. at 18-19. 
 130. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). 
 131. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.) 
(stating that petition “raises potentially important questions” regarding FIFRA preemption but that 
lower court decision was not final judgment). 
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traying Montana as an insignificant anomaly.132 Statistically, of course, the 
Supreme Court tends to grant certiorari in the cases it is inclined to reverse 
rather than those it is inclined to affirm.133 The grant in Bates, especially 
against the government’s recommendation, may thus be an indication that 
the Court plans to stick to its Sprietsma guns, once again upsetting the set-
tled view of most lower courts (including the Fifth Circuit in Bates) in fa-
vor of preemption. 
One wild card, though, is the government’s own flip-flop. The weight 
accorded to the executive branch’s opinion about preemption has been an 
increasingly important theme of preemption cases, a theme especially em-
phasized by Justice Breyer.134 In addition, Bates concerns claims that a pes-
ticide did not work as promised, causing crop damage, not claims of per-
sonal injury from exposure to a pesticide. It thus raises an issue similar to 
the issue in Sprietsma regarding the scope of preemption when an agency 
has authority to enact potentially preemptive regulations but has not done 
so. It may have been this issue, rather than FIFRA per se or the theoretical 
differences between common law and positive law, that piqued the Court’s 
interest in Bates. Depending on how the Court resolves those issues, it may 
avoid a broad holding on FIFRA preemption. 
III.  SPRIETSMA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR FIFRA 
Despite its rejection of the reasoning of many FIFRA preemption 
cases, Sprietsma by itself was unlikely to lead the lower courts en masse to 
reconsider prior holdings that FIFRA preempts common law claims. Par-
ticularly in the federal courts of appeals, the fact that Sprietsma involved a 
different statute would probably have been enough for most courts to ad-
here to their prior rulings based on stare decisis and the rule against over-
ruling the decision of a prior panel.135 But as the Supreme Court considers 
the question of FIFRA preemption in Bates, the principles set out unani-
 
 132. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, Case No. 03-
388. The Bates brief did not mention the Oregon decision in Brown v. Charles H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 
846 (Or. App. 1999), review denied, 6 P.3d 1098 (Or. 2000). 
 133. Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. 
L. REV. 727, 742 n. 66 (2001) (noting that Supreme Court “routinely reverses or vacates twice as many 
cases as it affirms”). 
 134. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (“We place some weight 
upon [the Department of Transportation’s] interpretation of [regulatory] objectives and its conclusion, 
as set forth in the Government’s [amicus] brief, that a tort suit such as this one would ‘“stan[d] as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution”‘ of those objectives.”). See also infra notes 181–191and 
accompanying text. 
 135. See, e.g., Santamaria v. Horsely, 110 F.3d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It is settled law that 
one three-judge panel . . . cannot ordinarily reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.”). 
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mously in Sprietsma should lead it to conclude that FIFRA preempts very 
few, if any, common law claims. The Court should hold that FIFRA’s ex-
press preemption clause does not apply to common law claims and that im-
plied preemption arises only in “impossibility” cases, where the common 
law duty alleged in a state lawsuit would require that federal law be vio-
lated. 
A. FIFRA’s Express Preemption Clause 
The starting point for any preemption analysis is the text of the poten-
tially preemptive federal statute. In Cipollone and Medtronic—and again in 
Sprietsma—Justice Stevens scrutinized the statutory text for evidence of 
whether Congress intended to preempt common law claims as well as en-
actments of positive law.136 In FIFRA’s case the text and the legislative his-
tory support an inference that Congress did not intend to preempt common 
law claims. Because, however, there is no clear statement one way or the 
other in the text, it is critical which presumption one adopts: a presumption 
that common law is equivalent to positive law, and thus presumed to be 
preempted, or a presumption against expanding the scope of preemption 
automatically to include common law merely because positive law has 
been preempted. As we shall see, Sprietsma adopts the latter presumption, 
rightly recognizing a meaningful distinction between common law and 
positive law.137 But first, this section sets forth the textual argument that 
FIFRA’s express preemption clause does not encompass common law ac-
tions. 
A casual reader of the many judicial decisions finding broad FIFRA 
preemption of state law would be surprised to discover that the so-called 
FIFRA preemption clause is actually subsumed within a provision that ex-
pressly reserves power to the States: 
§ 136v. Authority of States. 
(a) In general. A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally regis-
tered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the 
regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter. 
(b) Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any re-
quirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from 
those required under this subchapter.138 
Taken as a whole, this provision is better described as a qualified saving 
clause rather than as a preemption clause. Subsection (a) plainly refers to 
 
 136. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 486-91 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 137. See Part III.B, infra. 
 138. 7 U.S.C. § 136v. 
HENDRICKS_FMT_CHANGES.DOC 2/23/2005  4:08 PM 
86 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 15:1 
positive enactments by the State. While the first clause of (a) could, in the 
abstract, be understood to permit both positive and common law “regula-
tion” of the sale or use of pesticides, the “but only . . .” clause cannot natu-
rally or even coherently be understood in that fashion. In order for a com-
mon law “regulation” to “not permit” a particular sale or use of a pesticide, 
a state would have to be required to impose tort liability for such a sale or 
use. If Congress had wanted to create tort-like remedies for violations of 
FIFRA, it would have done so directly, not by trying to mandate liability 
under state law. The natural reading of subsection (a) – as referring exclu-
sively to positive law – is also the only possible reading. 
Before moving on to subsection (b), it is worth pausing to consider 
one possible implication of this argument. The purpose of a saving clause is 
to foreclose preemption that might otherwise be inferred (under principles 
of implied preemption) from FIFRA’s comprehensive regulation of pesti-
cides. I have just argued that subsection (a), FIFRA’s saving clause, does 
not refer to common law claims. Does this mean that common law claims 
based on sale or use violations are preempted, even though positive law is 
“saved”? To the contrary, the statute is clear that states have primary en-
forcement responsibility for both state and federal rules for pesticide use, as 
long as the State regime is at least as stringent as the federal one.139 The 
point is not that Congress was drawing a distinction between positive law 
and common law but that it was not even thinking about common law in 
this context. The common law tort system is ancillary to, not directly part 
of, the regulatory system that was Congress’s focus in drafting FIFRA.140 
Turning, then, to subsection (b), its most salient feature is that its 
scope is limited to qualification of subsection (a). It opens “Such State . . .,” 
meaning “a state that is exercising the regulatory authority reserved to it by 
subsection (a).”141 This context compels the conclusion that when it prohib-
ited any State labeling “requirements,” Congress was contemplating re-
quirements that might be imposed on labels in the course of State regula-
tion of sale or use. After all, in the absence of subsection (b), a State 
enacting a prohibition on a particular use of a pesticide might well “re-
quire” that this prohibition be mentioned on the label. This relationship be-
tween subsections (a) and (b) strongly suggests that the word “require-
ments” in subsection (b) refers only to positive law. 
 
 139. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). 
 140. See The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 24 (a), 86 
Stat. 973, 997 (1972). 
 141. Id. 
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This context also explains the use of the word “requirements” in sub-
section (b) rather than “rule” or “regulation,” each of which more strongly 
connotes positive law.142 Subsection (a) authorizes particular categories of 
“regulations,” while subsection (b) is concerned with particular features or 
“requirements” that might be part of those regulations. It would be unnatu-
ral to use the word “regulation” again in subsection (b) where a different 
meaning was intended. “Requirements” is a natural alternative that does not 
necessarily refer to common law duties, and in this context clearly does not 
do so. 
The conclusion that § 136v(b) does not preempt common law claims 
is reinforced by a thorough review of FIFRA’s text and legislative history 
presented by the EPA in its original amicus brief on this issue. Citing Med-
tronic, which examined how the word “requirements” was used throughout 
the statute at issue, the EPA noted the normal rule of statutory construction 
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to 
have the same meaning.143 The EPA then counted seventy-five uses of the 
word “requirements” in FIFRA, each plainly referring only to positive 
law.144 As in Medtronic, the EPA concluded, the statute’s “focus is . . . 
positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of 
general rules of common law by judges and juries.”145 A similarly exhaus-
tive review of FIFRA’s extensive legislative history revealed no intent or 
expectation that tort liability would be preempted.146 To the contrary, as in 
Silkwood, what evidence exists suggests that tort liability was preserved. 
For example, the EPA’s General Counsel testified, “The bill does not affect 
tort liability.”147 As the Supreme Court observed in Medtronic, if Congress 
 
 142. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992) (“Read against the backdrop of 
regulatory activity undertaken by state legislatures and federal agencies . . .  , the term ‘regulation’ most 
naturally refers to positive enactments by those bodies, not to common-law damages actions.”). 
 143. Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Etcheverry v. 
TRI-AG Serv. Inc., No. S072524 (Cal.) (filed March 1999) (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 
(1990)). 
 144. Id. at 14-16. 
 145. Id. at 17 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489 (1996)). 
 146. Id. at 23-32. The EPA reviewed over 2,300 pages of transcripts from 26 days of hearings held 
by three congressional committees; over 300 pages of committee reports; and over 150 pages of tran-
scripts from the five days of floor debate. Id. at 23-24. Out of 250 witnesses, including 36 from the pes-
ticide industry, three of the industry representatives mentioned product liability suits against their com-
panies, but there was no suggestion that they would be protected from suits in the future. Id. at 28. 
During the floor debates, the Senate version of the bill prevailed over the House version. The latter 
would have prohibited the states from regulating certain pesticides more strictly than the EPA. Id. at 31-
32. Congress also debated an indemnity provision, and members were assured that it would not apply to 
common law tort actions that might be brought against pesticide manufacturers. Id. at 32. 
 147. Id. at 28. 
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intended the opposite result, “its failure even to hint at it is spectacularly 
odd.”148 
As discussed above, the vast majority of courts (and the EPA under 
the Bush administration) have refused even to engage in this statutory 
analysis in order to determine the scope of FIFRA’s express preemption 
clause.149 Rather than analyze the statute, courts have relied on the equation 
of common law and positive law to erase any distinction between them 
with respect to preemption. Sprietsma rejects this easy approach and, by 
insisting that common law claims be considered separately, will require 
courts to analyze FIFRA and other federal statutes closely before deciding 
their preemptive scope.150 
B. The Return of Compensation 
Sprietsma’s unanimous statement that “[i]t would have been perfectly 
rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which—unlike 
most administrative and legislative regulations—necessarily perform an 
important remedial role in compensating accident victims”151 reinstated the 
presumption against preemption of common law claims and signaled a re-
turn to Silkwood’s concern for preserving remedies and preserving state au-
thority. Of course, even discounting the Court’s history of erratic holdings 
on preemption, the ruling against preemption by the FBSA does not compel 
the same outcome for FIFRA: the language and structure of the two Acts 
are of course different. What Sprietsma does suggest, however, is that the 
Supreme Court will decide the question of FIFRA preemption without the 
facile assumptions that have led so many courts to use FIFRA broadly to 
preempt state common law. 
Those assumptions are pinned to an enthusiastic acceptance of the 
theory of positive law–common law equivalence set forth in Garmon and 
expanded in Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cipollone.152 While it is 
certainly true that the common law regulates behavior, Silkwood and 
Sprietsma recognized that the common law’s role in compensating victims 
is equally well-established and important.153 In recent years, several indus-
tries have tried to convince Congress to give them explicit federal immu-
nity from state tort law; their attempts have sparked intense political con-
 
 148. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 490. 
 149. See Part II.C, supra. 
 150. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992). 
 153. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984); Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70. 
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troversy and public debate about the role of the tort system and the merits 
of having Congress take control of it.154 Regardless of the outcome of those 
debates, their intensity underscores the unlikelihood that the Congress that 
enacted FIFRA believed it was extinguishing significant areas of tort liabil-
ity. To hold that FIFRA broadly preempts common law claims is to hold 
that what is now a question of great debate about “tort reform” was accom-
plished implicitly and without comment in 1972, when FIFRA’s preemp-
tion clause became law.155 
In addition to advancing the separate goal of compensation, the tort 
system regulates by a different means from positive law. The threat of tort 
liability means a manufacturer of a potentially dangerous product cannot 
assume that a government seal of approval has immunized it from future 
liability. Traditionally, that uncertainty was seen as a good thing: compli-
ance with government regulations was not a defense to a negligence ac-
tion.156 It is simply too much to expect the government to make every nec-
essary safety decision in a timely fashion, as the Coast Guard’s 
bureaucratic delay in Sprietsma demonstrates.157 It also makes no sense to 
immunize the entity that is the primary source of information about the 
product. While federal regulators may be more skilled and have more re-
sources than state regulators, a jury, despite its lack of expertise, will often 
have more information than was available to federal or state regulators at 
the time they approved a particular safety standard. The common law regu-
lates by giving the party in the best position to take safety precautions an 
incentive to do so, rather than foisting the entire burden of protecting con-
sumers onto government agencies. The common law’s compensatory role 
and its unique form of regulation make it meaningfully different from posi-
tive law. 
While Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cipollone relied on Gar-
mon and emphasized the similarities between regulation through positive 
and common law, it should not have been read as an all-out endorsement of 
their equivalence, as his follow-up opinion in Medtronic made clear. Al-
though lower courts have reached near-universal agreement that Cipollone 
 
 154. See, e.g., Maria Newman, New Jersey Doctors Find Unity in Fight to Limit Malpractice 
Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at B3 (discussing attempts by New Jersey doctors, including a 
threatened strike, to force medical malpractice reform legislation); Y2K Liability Limits, N.Y.TIMES, 
July 3, 1999, at A10 (discussing the political struggle surrounding legislation to limit liability for poten-
tial “Y2K” computer failures). 
 155. Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 24, 86 Stat. 997 (1972). 
 156. See Reporters’ Study: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, Vol. 2, 83-84 (Am. L. Inst. Ed., 1991); see also Nelson, supra 
note 26, at 571-72 (discussing pros and cons of dual remedial systems). 
 157. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62. 
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compelled FIFRA preemption of common law claims, in Sprietsma Justice 
Stevens finally had the opportunity to right this wrong and return to Silk-
wood’s presumption against preemption of common law claims. 
C. The Importance of a Saving Clause? 
One important factor in Sprietsma, as in several of the Court’s recent 
preemption cases, was the presence of a “saving clause” expressly limiting 
the preemption clause, thereby preserving liability under the common 
law.158 Does FIFRA’s lack of a similar saving clause require the conclusion 
that common law claims against pesticide manufacturers are not saved but 
preempted? 
The Sprietsma Court stated that the FBSA’s saving clause “but-
tresse[d]” its conclusion, suggesting that the clause was not necessary to 
the Court’s conclusion.159 The Court analyzed the language of the preemp-
tion clause separately from the saving clause, turning to the latter only as 
reassurance that it had correctly interpreted the statute by reading the pre-
emption clause narrowly.160 The Court also noted that the saving clause 
supported its position that it was reasonable to conclude that Congress in-
tended to preempt positive law but not common law since the saving clause 
focused on preserving private damages remedies.161 
FIFRA’s saving clause is of a different sort. Recall that FIFRA’s sav-
ing clause preserves the authority of states to make certain categories of 
substantive regulations: “A State may regulate the sale or use of any feder-
ally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent 
the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchap-
ter.”162 The combination of this saving clause with the preemption clause 
means that states may regulate the sale and use of pesticides even if they 
cannot impose labeling requirements. 
A state thus has a back-door method of disagreeing with federal label-
ing requirements: if a state believes the EPA has not required sufficiently 
stringent safety warnings on a particular pesticide, it can ban the pesticide 
altogether through positive law. Although the state might not always 
choose this drastic step, if it does so, nothing in FIFRA makes the validity 
of the ban hinge on the state’s motive; so long as the ban is directed at the 
sale or use of the pesticide, it is within the saving clause. 
 
 158. 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g). 
 159. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 64. 
 162. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). 
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As a practical matter, if a large state believed more stringent labels 
were needed, it could use the threat of a complete ban to convince the 
manufacturer to submit a revised label for EPA approval. This scenario 
shows the incoherence of preempting common law claims by dissecting 
which claims are “really” about the label and which are independent of the 
label. A state is free under FIFRA to use positive law to ban the sale of a 
pesticide if it considers the warnings on the label inadequate. Why, then, 
should the same state be precluded from imposing tort liability under the 
same circumstances? 
A saving clause should not be necessary to save common law claims 
from preemption when there is no evidence Congress intended to preempt 
anything beyond competing positive law enactments from the states. Con-
gress knows that it acts against a backdrop of tort liability.163 Courts should 
neither presume Congress meant to alter that backdrop nor require Con-
gress to include a special saving clause in order to preserve common law 
claims. In FIFRA’s case, assuming the equivalence of positive law and 
common law can lead either to preempting common law claims or to pre-
serving them, depending on whether one focuses on the preemption clause 
or the saving clause. FIFRA is thus an excellent example of why courts 
should not assume such equivalence and should adhere to the Silkwood pre-
sumption against preemption of common law claims. 
D. Implied Preemption: Lingering Distrust of State Courts and Juries 
In addition to returning to Silkwood and recognizing the independent 
status of the common law, Sprietsma solidified the emerging majority view 
on applying implied preemption doctrine even when a statute contains an 
express preemption clause. In Cipollone and Medtronic, Justice Stevens es-
chewed the implied preemption analysis, limiting himself to interpretation 
of Congress’s stated intent.164 The contrary majority view, which Justice 
Stevens accepted and incorporated into his opinion in Sprietsma,165 reflects 
an unfortunate distrust of juries and state court judges It holds the potential 
for repeating past mistakes by authorizing ever-expanding preemption un-
moored from congressional intent; however, Justice Stevens also suggested 
some limitations, again based on a distinction between positive law and 
common law.166 While still engaging in the implied preemption analysis in 
 
 163. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988); Fairfax’s Devisee v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812) (stating that common law doctrines “ought not to 
be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose”). 
 164. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-531; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996). 
 165. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70. 
 166. Id. at 69-70. 
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order to ensure any cases of “impossibility” preemption are addressed, Jus-
tice Stevens would require clear evidence of congressional intent to pre-
empt common law in addition to positive law under “field” or “obstacle” 
preemption.167 
The Court’s strongest advocate of the need for implied preemption is 
Justice Breyer. In Medtronic, he argued the Court should not exempt com-
mon law claims from preemption without leaving the possibility of pre-
empting tort claims that directly conflicted with federal rules.168 It is worth 
giving closer attention to the hypothetical hearing aid example he offered: 
Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal 
MDA regulation requires a 2-inch wire, but a state agency regulation re-
quires a 1-inch wire. If the federal law, embodied in the “2-inch” MDA 
regulation, preempts the state “1-inch” agency regulation, why would it 
not similarly pre-empt a state-law tort action that premises liability upon 
the defendant manufacturer’s failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award 
by a jury persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1-inch 
wire is negligence)?169 
The litigation envisioned by this example requires, first, a plaintiff’s lawyer 
willing to allege that the defendant was negligent for failing to break fed-
eral law; second, a trial judge who will rule, on a motion for summary 
judgment, that a reasonable jury could find the defendant negligent for fail-
ing to break federal law; third, a jury that will so find; and fourth, appellate 
courts that will affirm such a verdict. Granting the existence of audacious 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges asleep at the wheel, it is still hard to imagine 
the convergence of all these requirements in a single case. Perhaps preemp-
tion doctrine needs a safety valve in case they do, but that small possibility 
warrants only a safety valve, not wholesale preemption of tort law. 
Of the three kinds of implied preemption—impossibility preemption, 
obstacle preemption, and field preemption—Justice Breyer’s example is 
one of impossibility. As a formal matter, there is nothing wrong with ap-
plying impossibility preemption to common law claims, in recognition of 
the theoretical possibility of a rogue judge and jury punishing a defendant 
for obeying federal law. Justice Breyer, however, uses the example to jus-
tify applying the full range of implied preemption doctrine. But the exam-
ple does not support applying field or obstacle preemption to common law 
claims in cases where an express preemption clause exists and does not 
clearly preempt those claims. If interpretation of the express preemption 
clause results in preservation of common law claims, how can Congress 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 504. 
 169. Id. 
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have intended to occupy the field, and how can allowing common law 
claims create an obstacle to Congress’s goals? 
A problem inherent in field and obstacle preemption of common law 
claims is that they require courts to assess competing legislative goals. 
Many federal safety laws try to create uniform, national standards and in-
crease safety and oversight of the industry. Congress’s job is to balance 
these competing interests, but too often the Court has relied solely on the 
need for uniformity and thus preempted tort claims without any evidence of 
how Congress might have struck the balance.170 Implied preemption analy-
sis thus draws courts into the legislative task of fine-tuning remedies to 
achieve specific policy goals. While this may be inevitable where Congress 
has not provided guidance through an express preemption clause, it should 
be avoided in cases where Congress has already spoken. 
Although the Court has now made clear that the existence of an ex-
press preemption clause does not preclude application of its implied pre-
emption doctrine,171 Sprietsma hints at a limitation on this rule. Justice Ste-
vens, of course, argued in Cipollone and Medtronic that implied 
preemption analysis had no place where Congress had already expressly 
stated its preemptive intent.172 Although in Sprietsma he acceded to Justice 
Breyer’s arguments in favor of a safety valve, he adhered to his own views 
by treating the existence of the express preemption clause as creating at 
least a presumption against implied preemption: 
The FBSA might be interpreted as expressly occupying the field with re-
spect to state positive laws and regulations but its structure and frame-
work do not convey a clear and manifest intent to go even further and 
implicitly pre-empt all state common law relating to boat manufacture. 
Rather, our conclusion that the Act’s express preemption clause does not 
cover common-law claims suggests the opposite intent.173 
Thus Justice Stevens treated the “field” of providing remedies for unsafe 
boat manufacture as separate from the “field” of governing boat manufac-
ture through positive law and required separate evidence of preemptive in-
tent, just as he had when analyzing the express preemption clause. Con-
gress would not be presumed to have occupied one field merely because it 
had occupied the other. That the rest of the Court, including Justice Breyer, 
joined in this analysis suggests that a compromise has been struck. 
 
 170. See Davis, supra note 3, at 1016-18 (“The perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and 
has always been, a critical factor to the Court in evaluating whether a state law stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of federal objectives.”). 
 171. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)). 
 172. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 470, 518 (1992); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 499. 
 173. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69. 
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This compromise avoids an absolute ban on implied preemption where 
an express preemption clause exists, thus alleviating Justice Breyer’s con-
cern that state tort law could impose a duty in direct conflict with federal 
law. At the same time, it avoids the approach suggested by Geier, which 
renders Congress’s words and intent superfluous, passing by express pre-
emption clauses in favor of the Court’s own policy analysis under the ru-
bric of implied preemption. As the Court explained in Myrick, a presump-
tion against “field” or “obstacle” preemption beyond the scope of an 
express preemption clause is merely an application of “a familiar canon of 
statutory construction.”174 
Sprietsma thus represents an important opportunity for cabining the 
implied preemption analysis to a safety valve against direct, “impossible” 
conflicts, where it is impossible to obey both state and federal law. “Field” 
and “obstacle” preemption of common law claims would be rejected unless 
the Court found that Congress’s “clear and manifest intent” was to preempt 
common law claims. If evidence of such intent is not discovered in the 
course of analyzing the express preemption clause, it is unlikely to emerge 
as a basis for implied preemption—at least not if the Court’s analysis is 
limited to the text of the statute and its legislative history, the traditional 
sources of evidence of congressional intent. 
E. Post Script: Chevron, Skidmore, and Political Preemption 
In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly looked 
beyond the text and legislative history to a new source of information re-
garding the proper preemptive scope of a statute: the opinions of the 
agency charged with enforcing the statute.175 I have argued above that, un-
der Sprietsma, if an express preemption clause is found to be narrow and 
not to apply to common law claims, then the Court should presume that 
common law claims are not preempted and invoke implied preemption only 
in cases of impossibility. Because the Court should already have examined 
Congress’s intent in its analysis of the express preemption clause, this pre-
sumption against any significant role for implied preemption is unlikely to 
be rebutted by some new evidence of congressional intent that, for some 
reason, was not considered in interpreting the express preemption clause. 
The more likely source of new evidence is the administrative agency’s 
statements to the Court, probably in the form of an amicus brief, that allow-
ing tort claims to proceed would interfere with its ability to achieve Con-
gress’s goals. 
 
 174. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995). 
 175. E.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-86 (2000). 
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In Silkwood, the government made this very argument, appearing as 
an amicus to argue in favor of preemption.176 The Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s arguments in the same way it would dismiss the unpersuasive 
contentions of a litigant.177 But more recently, in Geier, the views of the 
executive branch played a more prominent role in the Court’s preemption 
analysis.178 In the FIFRA context, the EPA’s public stance against preemp-
tion helped drive the small groundswell of reconsideration that produced 
the anti-preemption decisions in Montana and Oregon.179 The Montana 
court, citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., held that it would defer to the EPA’s views on preemption.180 In Bates, 
the pesticide manufacturer will undoubtedly urge the Court to defer to 
EPA’s new position in favor of preemption. 
But should the Court really defer to the executive branch on what is, 
after all, a legal question under the Supremacy Clause? The answer is that 
it depends. The purpose of preemption analysis is to determine whether and 
to what extent the exercise of federal law-making authority has displaced 
state authority. The Supreme Court recently explained that the deference 
owed to the executive branch’s views on preemption depends on how Con-
gress has exercised its preemptive power: either directly or by delegating 
the preemption decision to the agency.181 
True Chevron deference applies where the agency interprets a statu-
tory provision that it is charged with enforcing. Such delegation of policy-
making power is more common on substantive issues than on quasi-
procedural issues like preemption. For example, the National Bank Act 
charged the federal Comptroller of the Currency with enforcing rules gov-
erning “interest” on credit cards.182 The Supreme Court deferred to the 
agency’s view that “interest” included “late fees.” Resolving this kind of 
ambiguity is a policy choice, which Congress left for the agency to 
 
 176. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984). 
 177. See id. (stating that “exposure to punitive damages does not frustrate any purpose of the fed-
eral remedial system”). 
 178. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-86. 
 179. The EPA’s brief was also temporarily accepted in the Ninth Circuit. In Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. 
DowElanco, 64 F.Supp. 2d 939 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the district court held that it was compelled by prece-
dent to find preemption but urged the court of appeals to revisit the issue. The Ninth Circuit complied, 
reversing the district court’s decision, 255 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000), but then reversed itself again on 
rehearing, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 180. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Mont. 2000) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 181. U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). 
 182. Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dak.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
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make.183 Under Chevron deference, the agency’s view is upheld so long as 
it is reasonable.184 Delegation is less common on the preemption question, 
but Sprietsma is one example, since the Federal Boat Safety Act allowed 
the Secretary of Transportation to exempt state regulations from preemp-
tion.185 In most instances, however, including FIFRA, there is no delegation 
of authority to the agency to make decisions about preemption. 
Even outside the agency’s delegated sphere of authority, it may still be 
helpful for the agency to supply a court with its views on questions of 
statutory interpretation, including preemption, that affect its field of opera-
tion. In such a case, however, the agency’s views are entitled to less weight 
and constitute merely “a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”186 This kind 
of deference goes by the less famous moniker of “Skidmore deference,” af-
ter Skidmore v. Swift & Co.187 Under Skidmore, the agency’s argument does 
not receive deference as under Chevron; instead, the agency’s argument is 
accorded “respect according to its persuasiveness.”188 
The difference between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference 
has important implications for the government’s reversal of its position on 
FIFRA preemption. Chevron deference allows the agency to make a policy 
choice. Although the Court has put limits on an agency’s ability to reverse 
that choice once made, the matter remains within the agency’s discretion.189 
As long as the change is well-justified, it may still receive deference. With 
Skidmore deference, however, the agency’s contribution is not its policy 
choice but its familiarity and insight into the practical realities of imple-
menting the statute. This institutional knowledge does not change at the 
agency’s discretion, nor does the persuasiveness of an argument. When the 
government reversed its position on FIFRA preemption, it was not because 
it discovered an error in its previous analysis of the statute or because the 
reality of implementing the statute changed. The government merely de-
cided that it preferred a different legal analysis, one that embraced the 
equivalence of tort claims and positive law, rather than one driven by the 
text and history of the statute.190 The conflict between the EPA’s old brief 
 
 183. Id. at 742. 
 184. Id. at 744-45. 
 185. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 58-59 (2002). 
 186. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 187. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 188. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 189. See, e.g., Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742. 
 190. The government’s only explanation for its reversal was that it had “reexamined the position 
that it urged” in prior cases, which “no longer represents the view of the United States.” Br. for the U.S. 
as Amicus Curiae at 9, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.). 
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and the new one is not a conflict over how to exercise the agency’s discre-
tion over policy-making but a disagreement over legal analysis. Courts do 
not need agency guidance on how to perform a legal analysis of a statute, 
and the arguments in both briefs, like the government’s arguments in Silk-
wood, should be accorded only “respect according to [their] persuasive-
ness.”191 
When Congress regulates on matters of health and safety, its mandates 
set a floor. The extent to which federal requirements are also a ceiling (and 
thus additional state requirements are preempted) is a policy judgment 
based on the relative value of uniformity as compared to increased safety 
and the availability of compensation. Administrative agencies, however, 
can reasonably be expected to have an institutional bias in favor of uni-
formity. Where the preemption decision has not been delegated, the 
agency’s claim that tort claims would interfere with uniformity goals is a 
complaint that should be directed to Congress, not the courts. The courts 
should not defer to the agency’s policy judgment on this issue when Con-
gress has not delegated the agency the authority to make that call. 
CONCLUSION 
As the author of the plurality opinions in Cipollone and Medtronic, 
Justice Stevens has had enormous influence on the jurisprudence of FIFRA 
preemption. Unfortunately, that influence has taken the form of lower 
courts simplistically applying one part of Cipollone rather than imitating 
the Justice’s careful analysis of the statute at issue in each case. In 
Sprietsma, Justice Stevens marshaled the full Court behind an opinion cor-
recting the lower courts’ one-sided and expansive approach to preempting 
common law claims. 
While the Court has previously issued and then quickly abandoned 
unanimous statements regarding preemption doctrine, Sprietsma is a step 
toward formulating a more coherent doctrine that will be more easily ap-
plied in the lower courts, rather than requiring the Supreme Court to ad-
dress each statute one-by-one. This approach reinstates the presumption in 
Silkwood that Congress would not preempt a significant number of tort 
claims without giving clear indication of its intent to do so. The Court will 
continue to use implied preemption analysis as a safety valve against “im-
possible” conflicts between state and federal law. But the Court should ap-
ply the presumption against preemption and find “obstacle” or “field” pre-
emption only in unusual circumstances and on the basis of clear evidence 
of congressional intent. Where Congress has provided an express preemp-
 
 191. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
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tion clause, that clause should be taken as the full expression of the extent 
to which Congress wishes to occupy the field, or the extent to which state 
law would pose an obstacle to congressional policy. This more modest pre-
emption doctrine will steer the Court away from increasing reliance on fed-
eral regulatory agencies as the sole protectors of public safety, to the exclu-
sion of state law protections, and back toward the traditional method of 
using the common law to promote safety and compensate victims of unsafe 
conduct. 
